Footnotes:

1.   The order I am thinking of here is that expressed by the most fundamental theories and equations of physics. Many leading physicists have recognized each of the above features of this order. For example, Nobel laureate (and atheist) Steven Weinberg, has noted how this perceived beauty has guided physicists in choosing the correct equations. (See his Dreams of a Final Theory. New York: Vintage Books, 1994, Chapter 6, “Beautiful Theories.”) Weinberg even admits that “sometimes nature seems more beautiful than strictly necessary” (1992, p. 250). Concerning the universe’s discoverability and intelligibility, Albert Einstein famously remarked that “the most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible.” (“Physics and Reality.” Journal of the Franklin Institute, 221(3), 1936): 349-382.) Similarly, Eugene Wigner, one of the major founders of quantum mechanics, wrote in an often-cited essay that our ability to successfully use mathematics to uncover the order of nature borders on the miraculous. (“The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.” Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics, 13(1), 1960: 1-14.) Finally, the fine-tuning of the cosmos for life refers to the fact that the basic structure of the cosmos must be set to an enormous degree of precision for life to occur. This has received much discussion in the past forty years. For the most up-to-date discussion of this fine-tuning, see Barnes, Luke, and Geraint Lewis. 2016. A Fortunate Universe: Life in a Finely Tuned Cosmos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For a popular presentation, see my “The Case for Cosmic Design,” in Paul Draper, editor, God or Blind Nature?: Philosopher’s Debate the Evidence (2007-2008), at https://infidels.org/library/modern/robin-collins-design. Finally, for a sophisticated account of how it supports theism, see my “The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe.” William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, ed. The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 202–28.

2.   Even many who believe the fundamental order is a brute fact, such as Norman Swartz, recognize that it seems to be an enormous cosmic coincidence. (See his The Concept of Physical Law, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 203- 204.) However, they claim that alternative explanations either are incoherent or involve hypothesizing their own cosmic coincidence: as Swartz puts it, “at some point, we have our backs to the wall.” (Ibid., p. 204). Other philosophers find the brute fact hypothesis completely unacceptable. For example, non-theist philosopher David Armstrong claims that “if you believe that, you will believe anything.” (See David Armstrong, “Reply to Van Fraassen,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 2 (June 1988): 229.)

3.   A coin’s landing on heads ten times in a row only gives us reason to believe it will land on heads the eleventh time if we believe there was some reason for this occurrence, such as that it was weighted in favor of heads.

4.   For example, this is Richard Dawkins’ main objection to design arguments. (See Dawkins, Richard. 1986. The Blind Watchmaker. New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Co., p. 316.) This criticism goes back to the famous Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711 - 1776), who stated that that “there is no more difficulty conceiving that the several elements [of nature], from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like unknown cause, fall into that arrangement.” (See Hume, David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 2nd edition. Edited by Richard Popkin: Indianapolis, PA: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980, pp. 17-18.)

5.   I define a fundamental reality as a reality such that all other realities – except perhaps abstract realities, such as mathematical truths – depend on it, while it depends on nothing else.

6.   To clarify, it would only be coincidental if there were many, many other alternatives that we judged as equally good candidates for being fundamental, or if something about consciousness being fundamental made it intrinsically highly unlikely. Neither of these seems to be the case.

7.   An example of the kind of internal limitation I have in mind is one in which as a brute fact or some hidden metaphysical necessity, God cannot create some otherwise seemingly possible state of affairs, such as a world with unicorns.

8.   Such representations are what philosophers call possible worlds. Many philosophers – whether theist or non-theist – postulate the existence of possible worlds to account for the logic of statements regarding possibility and necessity (modal logic). Further, almost all of them hold that such worlds exist by metaphysical necessity, just as mathematical platonists do regarding mathematical truths. So, it is plausible to think the existence of such possible worlds is not coincidental.

9.   To keep things simple, I ignore here the existence of libertarian free-willed creatures whose choices God cannot actualize.

10.    For example, embodiment permits persons to be vulnerable to others and their environment, thereby allowing for such moral goods as sacrificially helping others in a natural disaster. (I elaborate on the eternal value of such goods in my essay, “The Connection Building Theodicy.” The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil, Dan Howard-Snyder and Justin McBrayer, eds., Malden, MA: Wiley- Blackwell, 2014, pp. 222-235.)

11.    At the core of the theistic explanation is the independently plausible principle that goodness and beauty are self-motivating. Via God, this principle favors the existence of realities that instantiate goodness and beauty, as arguably the order of this universe does. The challenge for naturalistic accounts is finding a non-arbitrary principle that favors the kind of order in our universe over the seemingly much vaster array of alternatives. I analyze this issue in much more detail in my "God and the Laws of Nature." Philo: A Journal of Philosophy, 12(2), 2009: 142–171. In that article, I consider other potential alternative explanations, three of which I briefly address here. For example, one might appeal to some underlying metaphysical necessity. However, I argue that this merely transfers the coincidence to why these necessities are such as to give rise to the kind of order in our universe instead of one of the vast number of other possibilities that seem far less significant. Another possibility is to claim that only universes with such order could allow for observers; hence, it is no coincidence (when combined with a multiverse hypothesis) that we find ourselves in such a universe. One major problem with this explanation is that such observers only require highly local regions of order, and hence we would not expect such order to continue in the future or exist in other parts of the universe. It also does not account for the discoverability or elegance of the laws of nature. Another potential explanation is a metaphysical or epistemological principle of simplicity according to which simple patterns are more probable than complex patterns. A major problem with this idea, however, is that under it we would expect the universe to be far simpler than it is, e.g., two particles traveling through empty space at a constant velocity relative to each other.